PRODUCTS LIABILITY-STRICT

LIABILITY

IN TORT-RISK/

UTILITY ANALYSIS TO BE USED IN DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF
DESIGN DEFECT; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE VALID DEFENSE
TO STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM ONLY UNDER NARROW "ASSUMPTION OF RISK" DEFINITION-Cepeda

v. Cumberland Engineer-

ing Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
Jose Francisco Cepeda, an eighteen-year-old employee of Rotuba
Extruders, Inc.,' was involved in an industrial accident during the
operation of a "pelletizing" machine in 1968.2 As a result of the accident, four fingers on Cepeda's left hand were amputated. 3 The
worker subsequently brought suit in New Jersey superior court, law
division, seeking a recovery on the dual issues of negligence and
breach of warranty against the manufacturer of the pelletizer, Cumberland Engineering Company. 4 Plaintiff's argument was based on
his contention that the pelletizer was "defectively designed from a
safety standpoint,"

5

in that a safety handguard supplied with the

I Counter-Statement of Facts, Brief for Plaintiff-Respondents at 1, Cepeda v. Cumberland
Eng'r Co., 138 N.J. Super. 344, 351 A.2d 22 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd and remandedfor limited
new trial, 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978) [hereinafter cited as App. Div. Brief for Plaintiff];
See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 164, 386 A.2d 816, 822 (1978). Cepeda was
an immigrant from Santo Domingo who neither spoke nor read English, and had received little
schooling. Id. at 164, 386 A.2d at 822. Moreover, he was barely literate in Spanish, his native
language. App. Div. Brief for Plaintiff, supra, at 1.
2 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 160, 386 A.2d 816, 820 (1978). Cepeda
had been at work for Rotuba Extruders for eight months prior to the occurrence of the accident
on April 3, 1968. Id. at 164, 386 A.2d at 822. A pelletizer is designed to draw multiple strands
of plastic emitted by another machine, and position them so that they might be cut into small
pellets for storage and shipment. When a supplied guard was on the machine, the plastic
strands were introduced into the mechanism through a horizontal opening in the guard adjoining the table, resulting in a space too small for a man's hand to enter. Id. However, the
pelletizer could be operated without the guard, and the plaintiff had been operating the
machine in such a condition for several hours before the accident. Once the plastic strands had
been fed into the pelletizer, the "nip-point" of two revolving rollers carried the plastic to a
rotating drum containing knives which cut the strands into pellets, and then discharged them
into a chute. Id. at 164-65, 386 A.2d at 822.
3 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 160, 386 A.2d 816, 822 (1978). Cepeda
testified through an interpreter that he was instructed in the use of the machine with the safety
guard on, but did not know its function until after the accident. Id. at 165, 386 A.2d at 822. He
further stated that he was never told not to operate the pelletizer with the guard off, although
the guard had been removed at times other than the night of the accident. Cepeda did admit
that he had never operated the machine before with the guard off, and had in fact cleaned the
pelletizer with an air hose while the guard remained on. Id. A supervising foreman at the plant
where Cepeda worked stated that he had told the plaintiff never to remove the guard from the
pelletizer since ""the machine could take his hand and whole arm off,' " and plaintiff stated at
depositions that he knew " 'the rollers could take his hand.' " Id. at 166, 386 A.2d at 822.
4 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 160, 386 A.2d 816, 820 (1978).
5 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 161, 386 A.2d 816, 820 (1978).
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machine was removable, and had been removed at the time of the
accident. 6 The case was submitted to the jury on the theory of strict
liability in tort, with plaintiff's motion to strike the defense of contributory negligence denied. 7 The jury found the pelletizer to be
defective in design, 8 and thus awarded the plaintiff $125,000 in damages. 9
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey held
on appeal that the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict had been erroneously denied. 10 It concluded that
"[slince a manufacturer is entitled to expect normal use of his product," I he could assume that a safety guard supplied with the
machine would be used. 1 2 The court further stated that as a con6 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 161, 386 A.2d 816, 820 (1978). Plaintiff
contended the pelletizer necessitated frequent removal of the safety guard in the normal course
of operation, and that such removal could have been anticipated by the manufacturer. Id. at
161, 386 A.2d at 820. On this basis, the plaintiff argued that the pelletizer should have been
equipped with an electronic "interlock" device which would have prevented use of the machine
when the guard was removed. Id.
An officer and plant manager for Rotuba Extruders testified on behalf of the plaintiff that
the safety guard had to be removed in two different types of situations. One was when there
was a drastic change in the color run of the plastic; the other when the strands jammed the
rollers. id. at 166, 386 A.2d at 822. When either situation occurred, the guard had to be
completely dismantled and the inside of the pelletizer blown out with air and cleaned of plastic
with shears and other tools. Id. The witness also noted that it took only a few minutes to
remove or install the guard, and that those who operated the machine were classified as unskilled. Finally, the witness testified that to the best of his knowledge the pelletizer was never
operated without the guard. Id.
7 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 138 N.J. Super. 344, 350, 351 A.2d 22, 25 (App. Div.
1976), rev'd and remanded for limited new trial, 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978). The appellate division noted that
[T]he judge submitted special interrogatories to the jury which required their determination as to whether the pelletizer was defective in design, whether such defect was a proximate cause of the accident, whether plaintiff was contributorily
negligent and whether such contributory negligence was a proximate cause of the
accident.
Id. at 350, 351 A.2d at 25.
s Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 138 N.J. Super. 344, 350, 351 A.2d 22, 25 (App. Div.
1976), rev'd and remanded for limited new trial, 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978). The jury
found that the design defect was the proximate cause of the accident. Id. at 350, 351 A.2d at 25.
It also found, however, that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in the operation of the
machine. Id.
9 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 138 N.J. Super. 344, 350, 351 A.2d 22, 25 (App. Div.
1976), rev'd and remanded for limited new trial, 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978). Defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict was denied. Id. at 350, 351 A.2d at 25.
10 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 138 N.J. Super. 344, 357, 351 A.2d 22, 29 (App. Div.
1976), rev'd and remanded for limited new trial, 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
11 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 138 N.J. Super. 344, 351, 351 A.2d 22, 26 (App. Div.
1976), rev'd and remanded for limited new trial, 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
12 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 138 N.J. Super. 344, 351, 351 A.2d 22, 26 (App. Div.
1976), rev'd and remanded for limited new trial, 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
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sequence of this presumption, the manufacturer could not "be held
responsible for unforeseeable negligence on the part of third par4
ties" 13 in the use of the machine without the safety device.'
Subsequent to a grant of certification, 15 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey in Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 16 endorsed
the requirement of the Restatement of Torts (Restatement) that a
product must be "unreasonably dangerous"17 to establish a defect in
13 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 138 N.J. Super. 344, 351, 351 A.2d 22, 26 (App. Div.
1976), rev'd and remanded for limited new trial, 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
14 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 138 N.J. Super. 344, 351, 351 A.2d 22, 26 (App. Div.
1976), rev'd and remanded for limited new trial, 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978). The court
cited Maiorino v. Weco Products Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965), as support for this
proposition. In Maiorino, the plaintiff lacerated his left wrist while attempting to open a glass
toothbrush container. Id. at 572, 214 A.2d at 19. The jury rejected his claims of negligence, and
breach of implied warranty 'of merchantability and of fitness of the product for use, due to the
plaintiff's own contributory negligence. Id. at 572, 214 A.2d at 19. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey then asserted that "[t]he reach of the doctrine of strict liability in tort in favor of the
consumer should not be extended so as to negate that expectation" of the consumer's normal
use of the product. Id. at 574, 214 A.2d at 20.
15 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 70 N.J. 274, 359 A.2d 486 (1976) (granting certification).
16 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
17 Id. at 168-72, 386 A.2d at 823-25; See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Section 402A was adopted by the American Law Institute in 1965, after it had undergone extensive development. 76 N.J. at 168, 386 A.2d at 823. It provides that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b)it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

The court noted that in design defect cases the Restatement criterion of " 'unreasonably
dangerous' " was appropriate "if understood to render the liability of the manufacturer substantially coordinate with liability on negligence principles." Id. at 171-72, 386 A.2d at 825. See also
Sklaw, "Second Collision" Liability: The Need for Uniformity, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 499, 523
(1973). The author, commenting upon the requisite proof of a defect in the design of an automobile, noted that a manufacturer might
overcome the assertion of a defect in the design of its product by showing that it
exercised "due care" in choosing it. The implication is apparent-the finding of a
defect is dependent upon a showing of a deviation from required due care, the basic
component of negligence. Once again, it appears that had the negligence theory
alone been available, the result would have been the same.
Thus, even where section 402A is the guiding theory of a case, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff merely to prove a defect. He must in fact prove that it was
unreasonable of the manufacturer to have created it. ...
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design, 1 8 with the requisite foreseeability of such defectiveness imputable to the manufacturer.' 9 To determine whether a product was
unreasonably dangerous, the court advocated the use of a "risk/
utility" analysis. 2 0 Under such an approach, liability would be predicated upon whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer, who has actual knowledge of the dangerous propensity of his product, would
have placed that product into the stream of commerce after considering both its hazards and utility to the user. 2 1 Employing these
criteria, and considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff,2 2 the court concluded that the appellate division determination that there was no affirmative basis for liability as a matter of
23
law was erroneous.
The supreme court further noted that only contributory negligence involving a "voluntary and unreasonable encountering by the
plaintiff of a known safety hazard," 2 4 not "mere carelessness or madvertance," 2 5 could serve as a defense to a strict liability in tort ac-

Therefore the conclusion reached is that under . . . strict liability theory, "defect" really means "unreasonable defect," and the proofs must be so directed ...
Sklaw, supra at 523.
18 76 N.J. at 171-75, 386 A.2d at 824-27. The court drew a major distinction where there
was a defect of a product "in the sense of an abnormality unintended by the manufacturer
....
at .d.
170, 386 A.2d at 825. In such an instance, the majority stated there would be
"prima facie liability for physical harm proximately resulting from the defect to a user or consumer without any need for showing of unreasonable danger in any other sense." Id.
19 Id. at 172, 386 A.2d at 825.
20 Id. at 172-75, 386 A.2d at 825-27. The court adopted this analysis from a series of law
review articles by Deans John W. Wade of Vanderbilt University and Page Keeton of the University of Texas School of Law. Id. at 163, 170-72, 386 A.2d at 821, 824-26. It represents a
balancing test in which it is determined whether a
reasonably prudent manufacturer with such foreknowledge would have put such a
product into the stream of commerce after considering the hazards as well as the
utility of the machine, the ease of incorporating a remedial interlock, the likelihood
vel non that the machine would be used only with the guard, and such other factors
as would bear upon the prudence of a reasonable manufacturer in so deciding
whether to market the machine.
Id. at 163, 386 A.2d at 821; see Wade, On The Nature of Strict Tort Liability For Products, 44
Miss. L. J. 825, 834-35 (1973).
21 76 N.J. at 176-78, 386 A.2d at 828.
22 Id. at 163, 386 A.2d at 821; see Shellhamer v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 14 N.J. 341, 345, 102
A.2d 602, 604 (1954).
23 76 N.J. at 162-464, 386 A.2d at 821.
24 Id. at 186, 386 A.2d at 833.
25 Id. at 185, 386 A.2d at 832. This type of conduct was referred to by the majority as
'ordinary' " contributory negligence. Id. The court expressly endorsed the form of contributory
negligence defined in Comment n of section 402A, which had been adopted by the majority of jurisdictions in the strict liability field. Id. at 184-86, 386 A.2d at 382-83; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965). Furthermore, it asserted that contribu-
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tion. 2 6 In this regard, the court found the jury's special findings of
both the plaintiff's contributory negligence and the absence of any
proximate causal relationship of his negligence to the accident to be
2 7
so inconsistent as to require a limited new trial.
Strict liability in tort, both as a legal theory and as an integral
component of the field of products liability, has emerged as a major
cause of action only in the past twenty years.2 8 Prior to that, claims
seeking to recover for injury or economic loss arising from the use of
a product were grounded in the common law concepts of breach of
warranty (both express and implied) and negligence. 2 9 The landmark
tory negligence could be a defense to a strict liability action, but only in the form of a renewed
"'assumption of risk" theory, where the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a
known danger. 76 N.J. at 184-86, 386 A.2d at 382-83.
This position was at apparent odds with the court's decision in Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp.,
60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972), and its companion case, Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60
N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972). See notes 76-91 infra and accompanying text. Justice Schreiber,
dissenting in Cepeda, argued that these two cases had made contributory negligence unavailable
as a defense to a defendant in a strict liability action as a matter of law. 76 N.J. at 201-02, 386
A.2d at 840-41 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The majority in Cepeda,
however, argued that there were factual distinctions between Bexiga and Cepeda, leading it to
conclude that the court in Bexiga was holding the plaintiff not to be contributorily negligent
within the limited "assumption of risk" definition which the court in Cepeda was adopting. Id.
at 198, 386 A.2d at 834. Since a jury could resolve the issue whether Cepeda voluntarily and
unreasonably encountered a known danger "either way" on the proofs submitted, the court
concluded that the dissent had incorrectly decided any questions regarding the plaintiff's conduct in his favor. Id. at 188-89, 386 A.2d at 834. If Bexiga in fact had disallowed contributory
negligence as a defense, the Cepeda court held that such a disposition "would fly in the face of
the almost unanimous view of the authorities, courts as well as writers, and synthesized by the
American Law Institute in Rest. 2d Sec. 402A, Comment n .
Id. at 189, 386 A.2d at 834.
26 76 N.J. at 185, 386 A.2d at 832.
27 Id. at 190-91, 386 A.2d at 835. The court asserted that if the plaintiff's conduct constituted contributory negligence as defined under Comment n of section 402A it was "obviously a
substantial factor in bringing about the accident.... " and thus the issue of proximate cause
would have to be aflrmatively resolved against the plaintiff. Id. A retrial was ordered on this
issue, but not as to the amount of damages to be awarded should Cepeda ultimately prevail. Id.
28 See Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71
YALE L.J. 816, 876-77 (1962). The author noted that
analysis of the developing case law indicates that even in the most recent cases
reliance has been placed on traditional negligence principles. There has been little
tendency to invoke a rule of strict liability in cases based on allegedly dangerous
composition or design. Outside of the area of food and drink, the few decisions
imposing liability without fault have in the main been restricted to things intimately
used, such as drugs, hair dye, soap, or cigarettes. As a recent article points out,
even most of the courts which accept strict liability as to food "refuse to apply it to
such things as automobiles, tires, pumps, insecticides, anti-freeze compounds, electric blankets, insulating materials, lumber, furnaces, or a portable elevator."
Id. at 876-77 (footnotes omitted).
29 See generally Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 559, 560 (1969). See also Keeton, Product
Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 35-36 (1973).
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decision of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 30 represented the
first indication in New Jersey that both of these contract and tort
remedies would be significantly broadened. In Henningsen, the New
Jersey supreme court held that a disclaimer of all express or implied
warranties on the part of an automobile manufacturer did not exclude
3
an implied warranty of merchantability on the part of the dealer. '
More importantly, the court extended the reach of such an implied
contractual duty to "the purchaser of the car, members of his family,
and to other persons occupying or using it with his consent." 3 2 This
effectively overruled the centuries old notion of privity of contract,
where a third party who was injured as a consequence of his or her
33
use of the defective product was barred from recovery.
The Henningsen decision had been predated by the New York
decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 3 4 which differed substantively with the New Jersey decision since it was grounded in negligence, as opposed to contract law. 35 In MacPherson, the court
30 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). In Henningsen, a man bought an automobile as a
Mother's Day gift for his wife from a Plymouth dealer. Id. at 365, 161 A.2d at 72. In the
seventh paragraph of the reverse side of the sale's contract was a provision which stated that
' there are no warranties, express or implied, made by either the dealer or the manufacturer
on the motor vehicle, chassis, or parts furnished hereunder expect as follows . . .' " Id. at 367,
161 A.2d at 74 (emphasis in original). The warranty then proceeded to limit replacement or
repair of the automobile to those defective conditions discovered within ninety days of its delivery to the original purchaser. Id. Finally, the provisions stated that " 'this warranty [is] expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied, and all other obligations or
liabilities on its part ..
.'" Id. (emphasis in original). Ten days after the car was delivered,
Mrs. Henningsen was driving the car at a normal speed when she heard a loud noise " 'from
the bottom, by the hood.' " Id. at 369, 161 A.2d at 75. The steering wheel spun in her hands,
and the car veered sharply to the right, causing her to crash into a sign and a brick wall on the
highway where she was traveling. Id. The complaint alleged a breach of express and implied
warranties and negligence by both the automotive dealer and manufacturer. Id. at 365, 161
A.2d at 73. The negligence count was dismissed by the trial court and the cause submitted to
the jury on the issue of breach of implied warranty of merchantability. Verdicts against both
defendants were returned, from which the appeals were taken. Id.
31 Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
32 Id. at 414, 161 A.2d at 100. The court expressed its willingness to extend the manufacturer's and dealer's responsibility as the result of its adoption of Dean Prosser's contention that
a warranty was " 'a curious hybrid of tort and contract.' " Id. Justice Francis, writing for the
majority, went on to say that this evolution of contract and tort law permitted a "relaxation of
rigid concepts of privity whe[re] third persons, who in reasonable contemplation of the parties
to a warranty might be expected to use or consume the product sold, are injured by its unwholesome or defective state." Id.
33 The notion of privity had been explicitly recognized in the English decision of Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), although exceptions emerged
where a product was found to be inherently dangerous if defective. Such was the case with
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852), where privity was dispensed with when injuries
resulted from the negligent mislabeling of a poison. See note 32 supra.
34 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
35 Id. at 385, 111 N.E. at 1051.
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found an action could be maintained against a remote manufacturer of
an automobile where it was reasonably certain that the product, if
negligently made, would place life or limb in danger, and an injury subsequently resulted from the defect. 3 6 It also extended the duty of
care on the part of manufacturers to those whose use of the product
was reasonably foreseeable. 3 7 Both the Henningsen and MacPherson
rulings, considered together, represented the death knell of the retention of privity in personal injury actions brought under tort or contract law. 38 The two decisions also initiated a gradual assumption by
the courts of public policy considerations that would impose an ever
39
increasing burden on manufacturers in the sale of their products.
The concept of strict liability evolved from the modification of
existing contract or tort law, as opposed to the development of an
entirely new concept. 40 With the California milestone of Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products,4 1 the amalgamation of tort and contract
theories assumed a new name-strict liability in tort. 42 Greenman,
which was tried on both negligence and breach of warranty
theories, 4 3 resulted in the enunciation by the California supreme
court of one of the two major definitions of strict liability in use today. There, a unanimous court asserted that a manufacturer would be
"strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have

36 Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. The MacPherson court attempted to extend the principle of
Winchester, see note 34 supra, beyond its sole application to poisons and explosives. It asserted
that the nature of the product "'gives warning of the consequences to be expected." Id. Therefore, if one had "knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser,
and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of
danger is under a duty to make it carefully." Id. The court added the caveat "[t]hat is as far as
we are required to go for the decision of this case." Id.
37 Id. at 394, 111 N.E. at 1054. The court noted by way of analogy that where "injury to
persons other than the lessee is to be foreseen, . . . foresight of the consequences involves the
creation of a duty." id.
I See Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability, supra note 29, at 560; Wade, Strict Tort Liability,
supra note 20, at 825.
'9 The MacPherson and Henningsen decisions reflected a growing concern that public policy
requires the supplanting of caveat emptor with caveat venditor in the purchase and sale of
consumer goods. Compare 217 N.Y. at 390-91, 111 N.E. at 1053, with 32 N.J. at 384, 161 A.2d
at 83.
40 See Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 20, at 829.
41 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
42 See Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 20, at 829.
43 59 Cal. 2d at 59, 377 P.2d at 898-99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698-99. Greenman involved a man
who received a power tool as a gift. He bought the necessary attachments to use it as a lathe,
only to have a piece of wood fly out of the machine, thereby injuring him while he was operating it. Id. at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
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a defect that causes injury to a human being." 44 In so doing, the
court largely abandoned arguments that privity of contract should remain a viable defense in a defective products action where physical
injury occurs, citing the strong impediment which a warranty theory
45
posed to the desired development of strict liability law.
Although the California supreme court initiated the doctrine of
strict liability in tort, section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (section 402A) remains the more widely accepted definition in use today. 46 The Restatement proposes that one who is in the business of
selling a product which reaches the consumer without substantial
change in its condition, is liable for any injury to the person or property of the ultimate user where that product is in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous."a7 This concept differs from the
Greenman rationale in three significant respects. First, the Restatement does not limit its application to the manufacturer of the
4
product, but extends its coverage to anyone who sells a product.
Secondly, the Restatement insists that the product not merely be
49
defective but in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous."
Thirdly, it assigns liability to the manufacturer of a defective product
50
which causes personal injury or property loss to the user.
Case law in New Jersey has steadily moved towards the express
adoption of the Restatement, with minor exceptions. Jakubowski v.
4 Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. By this definition, the plaintiff was
allowed to avoid the notice requirement for a breach of warranty action as delineated under
Section 1732 of the California Civil Code. Id. at 61-62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
45 Id. at 62-63, 377 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02. After a review of pertinent
case law in this area (including Henningsen), the court stated,
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of
an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the
abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that
the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law . ..and the refusal to
permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective
products .. .make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract
warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort ...
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.
Sales warranties serve this purpose fitfully at best.
Id. at 63--64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (citations omitted).
46 See 76 N.J. at 168-69, 386 A.2d at 823-24.
47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For the text of section 402A, see note

18 supra.
46 Compare Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P. 2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700, with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See generally Wade, Strict Tort Liabil-

ity, supra note 20, at 829-30.
50 See note 48 supra.
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Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing51 involved an automobile
mechanic and body finisher in a Ford plant who was injured on the
job when a sanding disc broke from its shaft and struck him in the
stomach. 52 The plaintiff worker was required to present evidence
that one of the four possible causes of the break as defined by the
court-manufacturing flaw, inadequate design, misuse, or
overuse-was "more probably than not the cause of the [injury]
. . . for which the defendant is responsible," 53 a burden which the
majority concluded had not been met. 54 The Jakubowski court went
on to adopt "unreasonably dangerous" as a standard of proof, requiring the plaintiff to show such a condition existed both for the product's intended use, and at the time the product left the hands of the
defendant, in order to establish culpability. 5 5 In so doing, the decision anticipated the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement of section
56
402A.
Subsequently, the 1965 decision of Santor v. A & M Karagheusian 57 extended the scope of a manufacturer's strict liability to include property losses suffered by a purchaser. 58 In its decision, a
unanimous supreme court reversed an appellate level determination
that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages for a defective
carpet, noting after a review of relevant case law "that there is no
sensible reason for distinguishing in . . . [breach of warranty and
strict liability] cases between personal injury and property damage
claims." 59 The court utilized a theory of "enterprise liability" 60 to
justify its decision, maintaining that those who place defective products into the stream of commerce bear the cost of proximately caused
injuries or damages, "rather than [those] injured or damaged persons
61
who ordinarily are. powerless to protect themselves."
51 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964).

52 Id. at 180-81, 199 A.2d at 828.
53 Id. at 186, 199 A.2d at 831.

54 Id.
55 Id. at 182, 186, 199 A.2d at 829, 831.
56 See note 17 supra.
57 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
58 Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312. The court expressed its agreement with the decision of
Randy Knitwear, Inc., v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E. 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d
363 (1962), where the New York Court of Appeals asserted that it could "perceive no warrant
for holding . . . that strict liability should not here be imposed because the defect involved ...
is not likely to cause personal harm or injury." Id. at 15, 181 N.E. at 403-04, 226 N.Y.S.2d at
369.
59 44 N.J. at 60-62, 207 A.2d at 309-10, 314.
6o Id. at 65, 207 A. 2d at 312.

61 Id. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967),
renewed the argument that strict liability in tort could be confined to sales as opposed to
service transactions. Although the court did not address the issue of what constituted an action-
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Thus, by the late 1960's a clear pattern had been established
favoring the application of strict liability in tort where a consumer had
suffered physical injury or economic loss as a consequence of the use
of a defectively designed or manufactured product. What precisely
constituted a "defect" remained to be adequately defined, as did what
distinguished the burdens of proof in a strict liability action from
62
other types of product liability suits.
The New Jersey courts began to address these issues in the decision of Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp.,63 which, along with the
companion case of Finnegan v. Havir Manufacturing Corp. ,64 were
the first major New Jersey decisions to deal with a design defect.
These cases were decided after a number of judgments had been
rendered in the strict liability field based on defects resulting from
failures in the manufacturing process. 65 Both cases involved workmen who injured their hands on power presses alleged to have been
defective in design. 6 6 The plaintiff in Bexiga argued the design
able defect for an improperly manufactured or maldesigned product, it delineated those parties
potentially liable under a strict liability action. Id. at 234, 227 A.2d at 543.
In Magrine, a patient sustained a personal injury when a hypodermic needle being used by
a dentist broke off in her gum. The plaintiff asserted that the dentist should be liable on a
"spreading of the risks" theory. The trial court, however, attempted to insulate professionals
from personal liability. Arguing that the plaintiff's concept would increase already major costs in
the health field, the court contended that "the spreading of losses to their patients subverts,
. . . the policy consideration that the loss should be imposed on those best able to withstand it,
i.e., the manufacturer or other entity which puts the article into the stream of commerce." Id.
at 239, 227 A.2d at 545-46. On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the trial court's decision
in a per curiam opinion. See Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div.
1968) (per curiam).
The rationale of extending liability for a defective product to those in the best position to
assume its economic consequences was subsequently followed in Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co.,
113 N.J. Super. 279, 273 A.2d 606 (App. Div.), aff'd, 59 N.J. 365, 283 A.2d 321 (1971). The
court there found a duty on the part of the manufacturer to a consumer for having placed a
defective motorcycle into the marketplace, despite the fact that part of the vehicle's final assembly had been entrusted to an authorized dealer. 113 N.J. Super. at 289-90, 273 A.2d at 611.
Although Sabloff did not expand the definition of what constituted an actionable defect, it did
adopt Comment c of section 402A, which shifted the burden of accidental injury caused by
products sold in everyday commerce to those who market them. Id. at 287, 273 A.2d at 610.
62 The Jakubowski case was decided prior to the adoption of section 402A by the American
Law Institute. While it raised the possibility of a manufacturing or design defect in detailing the
four possible causes of the accident which the plaintiff had to prove more probable than the
others, it failed to expound upon what would constitute such defects. 42 N.J. at 186, 199 A.2d
at 831. For a comparison of the difference in proofs required for a negligence as opposed to a
strict liability action, see Sklaw, supra note 18, at 521-24.
- 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
- 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972).
65 See, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
66 Compare Bexiga, 60 N.J. at 405, 290 A.2d at 282, with Finnegan, 60 N.J. at 415, 290 A.2d
at 287-88.
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defect stemmed from the manufacturer's presumption that the purchaser
would adhere to the "custom of trade" by installing a safety device on the press itself, 67 rather than initially designing and incorporating such a guard into the machinery. 68 Finnegan also alleged
that the manufacturer believed that such a device would be installed
by the employer. 69 In both decisions, the New Jersey supreme court
found the manufacturer to have been strictly liable for having pro70
duced and sold a defectively designed product.
The Bexiga court initially asserted that the manufacturer could
not hope to immunize himself from liability where he places into the
market a "finished product which can be put to use and which should
be provided with safety devices because without such it creates an
unreasonable risk of harm." 71 The court then proceeded to the section 402A criterion of "unreasonably dangerous," where it determined
that the machine could have been equipped with a safety device by
the manufacturer without rendering the product "unusable for its intended purposes." 72 Finally, while not ruling out the possibile use
of contributory negligence as a defense to a strict liability or negligence action, the court asserted that such a defense would not be
73
allowed "where the interests of justice [so] dictate."
Finnegan closely followed, the reasoning of the court in
Bexiga. 74 The Finnegan court noted that section 402A required that a
product not only be in an unreasonably dangerous condition, but also
that the manufacturer expect the item to reach the user without substantial alteration. 75 Since the machine was subsequently modified
by Finnegan's employer, the court questioned whether this amounted
to a "substantial change," sufficient to constitute an intervening factor
which would absolve the defendant of liability. 7 6 The court determined, however, that the modification would have had little or nothing to do with the occurrence of the accident, if the safety guard
67 See Bexiga, 60 N.J. at 406-07, 290 A.2d at 283.
Id. at 407, 290 A.2d at 283.

69 See Finnegan, 60 N.J. at 417-20, 290 A.2d at 289-90.
70 See Bexiga, 60 N.J. at 410-11, 290 A.2d at 285; Finnegan, 60 N.J. at 423-24, 290 A.2d at
292-93.
71 60 N.J. at 410, 290 A.2d at 285.
72 Id. at 410-11, 290 A.2d at 285. The court did not use the section 402A language of
"unreasonable risk of harm," limiting its application to design defects. Id. For the text of section
402A, see note 18 supra.

73 60 N.J. at 412, 290 A.2d at 286.
74 Compare Bexiga, 60 N.J. at 406-07, 290 A.2d at 283-84, with Finnegan, 60 N.J. at 417,
290 A.2d at 289.
7' Finnegan, 60 N.J. at 423, 290 A.2d at 292.
76 Id. at 423-24, 290 A.2d at 292.
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had been provided. 77 Finally, the court refused to allow the use of
78
contributory negligence under Finnegan's particular circumstances.
The "unreasonably dangerous" concept inherent in section 402A
which appeared to have been adopted by Bexiga and Finnegan,79 was
later challenged in Glass v. Ford Motor Co.,80 a case involving alleged breaches of implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness
for a particular purpose. There the superior court held that the "additional element of 'unreasonable danger' is not a valid part of the concept of strict liability in tort in the State of New Jersey." 81 The
decision was based on the court's concern that such a standard would
place an impossibly high burden of proof on the plaintiff, thereby
defeating the purpose for which strict liability in tort had originally
been created. 82 Accordingly, while the Glass court expressly
adopted the section 402A definition of strict liability, the concept of
83
"unreasonably dangerous" was excised from its language.
The supreme court in Cepeda acknowledged that section 402A
was recognized in New Jersey and many other jurisdictions as a standard for liability, 84 but sought to draw a novel distinction between
the Restatement's application toward manufacturing and design defects. 85 Noting that the "black letter" of section 402A did not at77Id. The majority in Finnegan refused to accept section 402A's requirement (1)(b) that "the
manufacturer expect it to reach the user without substantial change." Id. Instead, it relied on its
holding in Bexiga, which asserted that
[w]here a manufacturer places into the channels of trade a finished product which
can be put to use and which should be provided with safetv devices because without such it creates an unreasonable risk of harm, and where such safety devices can
feasibly be installed by the manufacturer, the fact that he expects someone else will
install such devices should not immunize him.
Bexiga, 60 N.J. at 410, 290 A.2d at 285; see Finnegan, 60 N.J. at 423, 290 A.2d at 292.
78 60 N.J. at 424, 290 A.2d at 292. The majority did not elaborate why the circumstances of
Finnegan would not allow the use of contributory negligence. See id.
79 See notes 84 and 88 supra.
80 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (Law Div. 1973). The opinion in Glass failed to
discuss
the factual history of the case.
81
Id.at 601, 304 A.2d at 564.
82 Id. at 602, 304 A.2d at 564; see Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d
1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (plaintiff driver injured in collision with another truck need not
show defective condition of his own truck made it "unreasonably dangerous").
83 123 N.J. Super. at 603, 304 A.2d at 564. The Glass court's exclusion of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement of section 402A was subsequently overruled by the New Jersey
supreme court in Cepeda. See 76 N.J. at 179-80, 386 A.2d at 829.
- 76 N.J. at 168-69. 386 A.2d at 823-24. The court noted, however, that not all of the
comments to the Restatement had been accepted in other jurisdictions. Id.
85 Id. at 169-70, 386 A.2d at 824. Although the court characterized the differences between
the concepts of manufacturing and design defects as "frequently drawn in the literature," id., it
cited as support only the case of Volkswagen of America Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d
737 (Ct. App. 1974) (defects in construction process distinguished from defects in initial design
of product).
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tempt to define separate criteria for a strict liability action for either
type of defect, 8 6 the majority nonetheless asserted that there would
apparently be prima facie liability for "an abnormality unintended by
the manufacturer [ i.e., a manufacturing defect]" without any need for
showing unreasonable danger. 87 In the case of design defects, the
court chose to equate "unreasonably dangerous" with liability patterned on negligence principles. 8 8 Once the "dangerous propensity"
of the product had been shown at trial, the requisite of foreseeability
would be automatically imputed to the manufacturer as a matter of
law. 89 By taking this approach, the court adopted "what the great
majority of the courts actually do in deciding design defect cases
where physical injury has proximately resulted from the defect"90O
balance the magnitude of risk created by the product against any benefits arising from the peculiar design of the manufacturer. 91

86 76 N.J. at 170, 386 A.2d at 824.
87 Id. at 170-71, 386 A.2d at 825; see Keeton, supra note 29, at 562. Dean Page Keeton
took issue with the all-encompassing language of a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous"
standard contained in the Restatement. Keeton stated that he "would limit the use of the word
'defective' to the case of an unintended condition, a miscarriage in the manufacturing process."
Id.

A far less supportive view of the Restatement provision was provided by the California

courts in the case of Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 433, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978), which totally rejected the application of an unreasonably dangerous criterion to either
manufacturing or design defects. Id. at 426, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233-34. This
decision clarified the position taken by the California court in Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8
Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (injured plaintiff seeking recovery on theory of strict liability must show product contained defect which proximately caused
his injuries, but need not prove that such defective condition made product unreasonably
dangerous).
88 76 N.J. at 171-72, 386 A.2d at 825. The court adopted the view espoused in Jones v.
Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W2d 66 (Ky. 1973). The Jones court had held that in design
defect cases "the distinction between the so-called strict liability principle and negligence is of
no practical significance so far as the standard of conduct required of the defendant is concerned. In either event the standard required is reasonable care." Id. at 69-70.
89 76 N.J. at 172, 386 A.2d at 825; see Volkswagen ofAmerica Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A. 2d
737 (1974).
90 76 N.J. at 173, 386 A.2d at 826.
91 This concept, denominated by Deans Wade and Keeton as the "risk/utility" analysis, see
note 20 supra, was advocated by Dean Keeton as an alternative to two other tests used by the
courts. One standard asserted that a product was defective if it was "not reasonably fit for its
intended (ordinary) (or reasonably foreseeable) purposes." Keeton, Product Liability and the
Meaning of Defect, supra note 29, at,36. Dean Keeton had characterized this test as a "circuitous route to saying that the product is unreasonably dangerous." Id. at 37. The second test was
that set forth in Comment i to section 402A, which defined the term "unreasonably dangerous"
as a product which is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be reasonably contemplated by intended (and reasonably foreseeable) purchasers." Id. (emphasis in original). This
test was similarly criticized by Dean Keeton as being "vague and ... imprecise .. ."Id. The
use of either test was attributed by Dean Keeton "to the fact that many courts used warranty
theories initially in arriving at strict liability." Id. at 36.
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In enunciating a "risk/utility" analysis to determine whether a
design defect exists, the court essentially endorsed the model jury
instruction posited by Dean Wade. 92 The charge instructed members of the jury that a product in a defective condition would be
unreasonably dangerous 93 if it was "so likely to be harmful to persons
[or property] that a reasonably prudent manufacturer [or supplier],
who had actual knowledge of its harmful character would not place it
on the market." 9 4 Prior to a determination of whether the case for
liability should be given to a jury, the majority implicitly adopted
seven factors which Dean Wade believed the court, in a "balanced
consideration," might find precluded liability as a matter of law. 95
These included: (1) the utility of the product; (2) the product's inherent safety; (3) the existence of a safer alternative product which
might prove equally effective; (4) the feasibility of improving product
safety without destroying its utility; (5) the possibility of avoiding
danger through the exercise of care in using the product; (6) the
foreseeability by the user of the product's dangers and their avoidability; and, (7) the ability of the manufacturer spread the loss of an ad96
verse judgment by increasing costs or carrying liability insurance.
By using this approach, the court in Cepeda reached the conclusion
92

See Wade, supra note 20, at 839-40; see 76 N.J. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827.

93 The court substituted the section 402A language of "defective condition unreasonably

dangerous" for Wade's "not duly safe" terminology in the original model instruction. Compare
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) with 76 N.J. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827.
9 76 N.J. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827.
95 Id. at 173-74, 386 A.2d at 826-27. The court recommended the use of the model instruction, see text accompanying note 94 supra, if the case was sent to the jury, since it was likely
that instructing the jury of all seven factors would not be appropriate in every case. 76 N.J. at
174, 386 A.2d at 827. For a discussion of the seven factors, see note 96 infra and accompanying
text.
96 Id. at 173-74, 386 A.2d at 826-27. The seven factors suggested by Dean Wade are,
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to
the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury,
and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need
and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product
and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition
of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id.; see Wade, supra note 20.
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that while the foreseeability of the harmful character of the product
was not required to establish liability, foreseeability of the "kind of
97
use (or misuse) of the product which occurred is a relevant factor."
Judge Conford, writing for the majority, further noted that while
the original foundation for strict liability had been premised upon
warranty principles, 98 the concept as presently construed under section 402A was not limited by warranty tests which would simply determine whether the product was reasonably fit for its intended purpose or use. 9 9 Instead, the majority found an affirmative case for
strict liability could be shown by the plaintiff even where there had
been misuse or abnormal use of the product when the "actual use
proximate to the injury was objectively foreseeable." 100 Reviewing

97 76 N.J. at 175, 386 A.2d at 827. The court characterized the foreseeability of the nature of
the use or misuse of a product as an objective test. id. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827. In Newman v.
Utility Trailer & Equipment Co., 278 Or. 395, 564 P.2d 674 (1977), the court attempted to
distinguish foreseeability of the use which is required in a strict liability action, from foreseeability of the risk of harm. The Newman court hypothesized that one may use a shovel to hold open
a door. If the shovel fails to keep the door open, due to its design, which results in the injury of
one using the doorway, the manufacturer of the shovel would not be liable, since he could not
have reasonably foreseen his product being used in this manner. Id. at 399, 564 P.2d at 676-77.
The court went on to state that
[w]hether or not the article was put to a foreseeable use is a jury question unless
. . . reasonable minds could not differ, in which instance the case would be at an
end. On the other hand, if it is decided as a matter of law by the court or as a
matter of fact by the jury that the article was being put to a foreseeable use at the
time of the injury, it is assumed that the manufacturer or seller was aware of the
risk involved which caused harm to the plaintiff, whether or not the manufacturer
or seller actually had such knowledge or reasonably could have been expected to
have it.

Id. at 399, 564 P.2d at 677; see Galvan v. Prosser Packers, Inc., 83 Wash. 2d 690, 692-93, 521
P.2d 929, 931 (1974); Eshbach v. W. T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1973);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h (1965).
98 76 N.J. at 176, 386 A.2d at 828.
9 Id.; see Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 147, 305 A.2d 412, 421 (1973). In reviewing the landmark decision of Henningsen, supra note 30, the Heavner court noted that while
the Henningsen opinion was couched in terms "of an implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for use," the court was in fact espousing "a new concept of tortious wrong-liability,
without proof of fault, for personal injuries and physical harm to property of consumers and
users by manufacturers and retailers who put defective articles in the stream of commerce.
Id. at 147, 305 A.2d at 421. See also Santor, 44 N.J. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311-12.
100 76 N.J. at 176-77, 386 A.2d at 828. The court's holding referred to comment h of section
402A which provides that if a seller has reason to believe the use of a product may create a
hazardous condition, he "may be required" to forewarn of the danger. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A, comment h (1965). If the product was sold without the warning, it would be
considered to be in a "defective condition." Id.; see, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968) (liability can be imposed where injuries are "readily foreseeable as
an incident to the normal and expected use" of product); Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60
Cal. App. 3d 533, 547, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605, 614 (Ct. App. 1976) (product is defective if so
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the appellate division's reasoning, the supreme court, in Cepeda declared the lower court's holding that there was no affirmative basis for
liability as a matter of law to be "plainly insupportable." 101 Although
the appellate division had utilized a version of the risk/utility analysis
without so denominating it, the supreme court asserted that the appellate court had given "insufficient consideration to the potential
jury question arising from the evidence" 1 0 2 -whether it was foreseeable that the pelletizing machine would sometimes be operated without a safety guard. 10 3 Moreover, the court found that there was
"credible evidence" that the guard often had to be removed during operations, from which a jury could have inferred that a reasonable manufacturer might have foreseen resumption of use of the machine on
occasion without the replacement of the guard. 10 4 Those cases offered by the appellate division as support for their position were
found by the supreme court to be based on "distinctly different and
distinguishable fact patterns," although it conceded that they were
"somewhat supportive" of the lower court's decision. 10 5 Since the
most recent defect cases reflected a trend to submit any ultimate

designed that its foreseeable use or misuse results in injury "which was readily preventable
through the employment of existing technology at a cost consonant with the economical use of
the product"). See also Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121, 348
N.E.2d 571, 577 (Ct. App. 1976) (manufacturer must use such care in his plan or design to
avoid unreasonable risk of harm to one who uses the product as intended or even in "an unintended yet reasonable foreseeable" manner).
101 76 N.J. at 180, 386 A.2d at 830.
102 Id.
103 Id. The court stated that the appellate court should have considered this possible jury
question, even though the trial court did not submit the issue of foreseeability to the jury. Id.
104 Id. at 180-81, 386 A.2d at 830. This conclusion was not affected by the fact that another
jury might reach a contrary conclusion on the question of foreseeability. Id. at 181, 386 A.2d at
830; see Schell v. AMF, Inc., 567 F.2d 1259, 1262 (3d Cir. 1977) (manufacturer not entitled to
ignore possibility that machine could be used in manner contrary to its normal operation).
Judge Conford also addressed the admissibility of testimony concerning what, if any, safety
regulations were applicable to the pelletizer's manufacture and operation. 76 N.J. at 192-93,
386 A.2d at 836. During the course of trial, the plaintiff had objected to the defendant's crossexamination of an expert witness to elicit whether the expert had studied safety regulations
promulgated by an appropriate state agency. Id. The majority in Cepeda decided the trial court
had erred in failing to confine the plaintiff's objections to the merits, as a matter of law. Id. at
193, 386 A.2d at 836. Evidence law was interpreted as allowing a response to the defendant's
original question, but not necessarily allowing the defendant to demonstrate the absence of any
safety regulation respecting interlocks. Id. Under this view, safety codes in existence when the
machine was marketed, while admissible, were not dispositive of the issue of defectiveness vel
non of an allegedly defective machine. Id. Ultimately, it was asserted that the "matter of admissibility of the non-existence of a regulation" lay in the discretion of the trial court. Id.
105 76 N.J. at 181-82, 386 A.2d at 830-31. See, e.g., Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 302 F.2d
570 (3d Cir. 1962); Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971).
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questions on the defectiveness of a product to a jury, 10 6 the supreme
court concluded that case law did not compel a judgment for the
10 7
defendant as a matter of law on the record of the case as tried.
The court in Cepeda next addressed the applicability of contributory negligence as a defense to a strict liability action by reviewing the status of case law at the time of its decision in Bexiga. lO8 The
New Jersey supreme court had earlier upheld the submission of contributory negligence as a defense to a strict liability action in Cintrone
v. Hertz Trucking Leasing & Rental Service. 109 There, the employee
of a lessee of a truck was injured when the vehicle's brakes failed. 1 10
The Cintrone court asserted that from all the evidence offered at
trial, a jury could conclude that the plaintiff knew the brakes on the
truck were defective, and that with such knowledge the plaintiff continued to drive the vehicle." 1 Justice Francis, writing for the majority, impliedly adopted comment n of section 402A, which embodied
Dean Prosser's view that such a defense would be allowed in those
cases where " 'the plaintiff had discovered the defect and the danger,
and has proceeded nevertheless to make use of the product,' " but
not in those cases where " ' the plaintiff negligently failed to discover
the defect in the product or to guard against the possibility of its
existence.' "112 This reasoning was subsequently reaffirmed in the
decision of Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc. 113 The Cepeda court

106 76 N.J. at 182, 386 A.2d at 831.
107 Id.
508

Id. at 183, 386 A.2d at 831.

109 45 N.J. at 434, 457-58, 212 A.2d 769, 782 (1965).

11076 N.J. at 183, 386 A.2d at 831.
"I Id. at 183, 386 A.2d at 831; see Cintrone, 45 N.J. at 459, 212 A.2d at 783.
112 76 N.J. at 183-84, 386 A.2d at 831 (quoting Cintrone, 45 N.J. 434, 458, 212 A.2d 769,
782 (1965)).
11353 N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278 (1969). Ettin differed from Cintrone in that its factual situation
represented the kind of contributory negligence traditionally expressed as mere carelessness or
inadvertance. 76 N.J. at 184, 386 A.2d at 832; see 53 N.J. at 472-75, 251 A.2d at 282-84. The
Ettin court quoted with approval from the opinion of Maiorino v. Weco Products Co., 45 N.J.
570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965), which stated that a plaintiff who was contributorily negligent could be
denied recovery
when his own lack of reasonable care joined or concurred with the defect in the
defendant's product as a proximate cause of the mishap and his injury. A manufacturer or seller is entitled to expect a normal use of his product. The reach of the
doctrine of strict liability in tort in favor of the consumer should not be extended so
as to negate that expectation.
Ettin, 53 N.J. at 472, 251 A.2d at 282 (quoting Maiorino, 45 N.J. at 574, 214 A.2d at 20).
Nonetheless, contributory negligence was held unavailable under the particular circumstances of
Ettin as a defense. 53 N.J. 474, 251 A.2d at 283-84. The majority did express a desire that
comparative negligence supplant contributory negligence, but noted such action would have to
be initiated in subsequent decisions or by the legislature. Id.
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consequently dismissed any interpretation of Bexiga that would compel it to abandon contributory negligence under the narrow defini114
tions advanced by the Cintrone and Ettin decisions.
Applying this rationale to the actions of Cepeda, the New Jersey
supreme court concluded that the plaintiff's "carelessness, if any, in
getting his hand caught in the plastic strands is not a defense." 115
The court noted, however, there was conflicting evidence whether
the plaintiff was aware of the purpose of the guard, although it was
undisputed that he had proceeded to operate the pelletizer without
any safety mechanism. 116 Accordingly, the jury's special findings that
Cepeda was contributorily negligent, but that his negligence was not
the proximate cause of the accident, were deemed by the supreme
court to be so inconsistent as to merit a new trial solely "on the issue
of unreasonable voluntary exposure to a known risk by [the] plaintiff." 117

Justice Schreiber concurred in the majority's reinstatement of the
jury determination of the defendant's liability, but dissented from the

Considering that both Cintrone and Ettin made reference to comment n of section 402A in
reaching their respective decisions, 76 N.J. at 184, 386 A.2d at 831-32, the court in Cepeda
endorsed the comment's "assumption of risk" doctrine as the proper standard to define contributory negligence when used as a defense in a strict liability action. Id. at 184-86, 386 A.2d
at 832-33. It asserted that aside from the newly emerging doctrine of comparative negligence,
comment n reflected "[t]he broad consensus of American decisional law and writing in the strict
liability field .... " Id. at 184, 386 A.2d at 832. The court further noted that
it is implicit in Comment n and the generality of the cases that only a limited range
of a plaintiff's conduct-not contributory negligence in the sense of mere carelessness or inadvertance-can be a defense to an action for strict liability in tort for
injuries sustained as the result of a product defect, particularly if the defect is one
of unsafe design.
Id. at 185, 386 A.2d at 832; see, e.g., Collins v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 558 F.2d 908, 911 (8th
Cir. 1977); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 329-30 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1970); Keener v. Dayton
Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1969); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.
2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305, 309-10 (1970); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions Inc., 31 N.J. 44,
51, 155 A.2d 90, 94 (1959).
11476 N.J. at 189, 386 A.2d at 834. The court commented that the total abandonment of
contributory negligence would be contrary to the "almost unanimous view" held by commentators and the courts. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, comment n (1965). It
therefore concluded that the continuance of an "unreasonable voluntary exposure of oneself to a
known danger as a defense to strict liability in tort . .. [would be] a fair balance of justice and
policy in this area." 76 N.J. at 189-90, 386 A.2d at 834 (footnote omitted). However, in footnote
9 to the Cepeda decision the court acknowledged that a "reasonable voluntary exposure of the
plaintiff to a known hazard should not excuse a defendant from liability for marketing an unreasonably dangerous machine." Id. at 189 n.9, 386 A.2d 834 (emphasis in original).
115 76 N.J. at 185-86, 386 A.2d at 832.
116 Id. at 189, 386 A.2d at 834.
117 Id. at 191, 386 A.2d at 835.
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court's findings on the issue of contributory negligence.' 1 " Paraphrasing Bexiga's summation of the public policy considerations behind its decision, 1 19 he contended the burden of proving contributory
negligence rested with the defendant manufacturer, and was unavailable as a defense when policy and justice so dictated. 120 An analysis
of the peculiar facts of Cepeda led Justice Schreiber to conclude that
there was no evidence the plaintiff had operated the machine
carelessly, 1 2 1 or that the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably had
exposed himself to a known danger. 122 The majority's assertion that
the plaintiff could have chosen not to operate the pelletizer was dismissed as "speculative and wholly conjectural." 123
Alternatively, it was asserted in Justice Schreiber's opinion that
even if Cepeda had acted in an unreasonable manner, he should
nevertheless be excused from contributory negligence. 124 This ar-

55s

76 N.J. at 194, 386 A.2d at 837 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

'19 Compare id. at 194, 386 A.2d at 837 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)

with Bexiga, 60 N.J. at 402, 412, 290 A.2d at 281, 286.
120 76 N.J. at 194, 386 A.2d at 837. Justice Schreiber additionally noted that New Jersey does
not adhere to the "scintilla of evidence" rule. See Long v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44, 54, 171 A.2d 1,
6-7 (1961). The application of this rule required the court's acceptance of a fact if proof of the
fact is such that no reasonable doubt can be entertained as to its existence. 76 N.J. at 194-95, 386
A.2d at 837.
An analysis of the peculiar facts of Cepeda led Justice Schreiber to conclude there was "no
evidence demonstrating the plaintiff's carelessness in the manner in which he operated the
machine." Id. at 195, 386 A.2d at 837. The justice premised his belief on the fact that when
Cepeda had commenced work on the night of the accident, the safety guard had been removed.
Cepeda nonetheless continued to operate the machine in this manner for three hours. Justice
Schreiber asserted that the plant foreman's failure to replace the guard implied "Cepeda's continued operation was with the consent and approval of his superior." Id. at 195-96, 386 A.2d at
837-38. Accordingly, he reasoned that Comment n to section 402A would not provide a defense
to the present action, since "neither logic nor policy supports its applicability to a situation
where an employee, at work, is injured using a machine which should have been inoperable."
Id. at 196, 386 A.2d at 838.
121 Id. at 198, 386 A.2d at 839. Justice Schreiber noted that this point was conceded by the
majority. Id.
122 76 N.J. at 198, 386 A.2d at 839.
12 Id. at 198-99, 386 A.2d at 839. Justice Schreiber believed thatt Cepeda's inability to read
or write English, and the failure by the foreman to warn or advise Cepeda in any way about the
machine, led one to draw the inference that the "employer approved Cepeda's operations, that
Cepeda believed he had to work, that he did in fact further his employer's interests, and that
he thought he would not be harmed if he acted carefully." Id. at 199, 386 A.2d at 839.
124 See id. at 194, 198, 386 A.2d at 837. Particular emphasis was placed by Justice Schreiber
on the definition of the doctrine of assumption of risk as enunciated in Meistrich v. Casino
Areana Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959). Meistrich stated that assumption of
risk was susceptible to two distinct meanings. Id. at 48, 155 A.2d at 93. In the first or "primary"
meaning (as denoted by the court), a defendant would owe no duty to an injured plaintiff who
"voluntarily and knowingly subjected himself' to a known danger. 76 N.J. at 197, 386 A.2d at
838. For example, a spectator at a baseball game, knowing its attendant dangers, who is hit by a
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gument was premised on the belief that a manufacturer owed the
users of a product a duty to provide the equipment with a locking
mechanism to render the machine inoperable should any safety devices be removed. 1 2 5 The Cumberland Engineering Company, however, failed to meet this burden by not supplying its pelletizer with a
safety interlock. 1 26 Thus, Justice Schreiber reasoned that since the
machine could not have been operated, and consequently the accident could not have occurred but for Cumberland's failure to provide
plaintiff in the use of
a locking mechanism, any carelessness by the 127
the machine without the guard was irrelevant.
A major effect of the Cepeda decision was to reincorporate the
term "unreasonably dangerous" as a vital component of section
402A.' 28 Glass had appeared to eliminate the Restatement provision
from strict liability as it was being defined in the courts of New Jersey. 1 2 9 However, Cepeda imposed the qualification that the provision should be understood to conform to the Wade-Keeton risk/utility
analysis of strict liability for defective products.' 3 0 Liability could
then arise from the presence of a defect alone, i.e., manufacturing
defect, where that defect is proximately 'related to the personal inAs a result, the majority believed the "unreasonably dangerjury.'31

foul ball would be denied recovery since no duty would be owed him by the team's owner or
the players. Id.
In its "secondary" meaning, assumption of risk may be used as an affirmative defense in a
case where there is "an established breach of duty." Id. at 197, 386 A.2d at 838. In this application of the doctrine, the knowing and voluntary placing of oneself in the risk situation is not
enough-there is an additional requirement of negligent conduct by the plaintiff. Id. Justice
Schreiber referred to an example cited by the late Chief Justice Weintraub in Meistrich where
an employer had a duty to furnish an employee with a safe place to work. Once the employer's
duty was discharged, he would no longer be responsible to the employee for remaining risks; in
effect, the employer was no longer negligent. However, even if the employer failed to provide a
safe work place, the employee's recovery would he barred if it was shown the employee's injury
resulted from his own carelessness. Id.
Although Justice Schreiber agreed with the majority's finding that the manufacturer violated its duty to equip the pelletizing machine with a safety guard or interlock which would
prevent the operation of the machine upon removal, id. at 198, 386 A.2d at 839, he asserted
that the very determination of such a duty negated the concept of assumption of risk in its
primary sense. Id. Accordingly, the justice concluded that any finding of contributory negligence "must be predicated upon something other than the plaintiffs positional risk." Id. The
evidence, however, did not show that the plaintiff had acted in an unreasonable manner. See id.
125 76 N.J. at 198, 386 A.2d at 839.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 196-98, 386 A.2d at 839-40.
128 Id. at 179-80, 386 A.2d at 829.
129 See 123 N.J. Super. at 601-03, 304 A.2d at 563-65.
13076 N.J. at 179, 386 A.2d at 829.

131 Id.; see Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 590, 326 A.2d 673, 677 (1974).
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ous" requirement could be discarded or held satisfied as a matter of
law. 132
More significantly, Cepeda represented the first attempt by the
New Jersey supreme court to arrive at a definitive determination of
what precisely constituted a design defect. In accepting section 402A
as a general standard for establishing defects in a strict liability action, 133 the court inferred that other jurisdictions had in practice actually created a distinction between manufacturing and design defects
in the factors to be reviewed for each type of product flaw. 134 Concurrently, by adopting a risk/utility criterion for design defects, the
court endorsed a complex balancing test in which the risk of the accompanying use of the product was viewed in light of its intrinsic
value to the public, thus providing a mechanism to fulfill the section
402A requirement that a product be adjudged "unreasonably dangerous" for liability to be imposed. 13 5 This concept was viewed by the
Cepeda court as derived from traditional negligence doctrine,' 3 6 and
stood in contrast to the standards for manufacturing flaws which allowed the establishment of prima facie liability simply by showing
physical harm proximately caused by a deviation from the way a product was intended to be assembled.' 3 7 Finally, the Cepeda court's
approval of comment n to section 402A as a proper guide to determine the applicability of contributory negligence to a strict liability
action appears to be a sensible interim measure as the court deliberates whether comparative negligence is ever to find a place as3 8a valid
defense to strict liability claims in the State of New Jersey.'
132 76 N.J. at 179, 386 A.2d at 829; see Keeton, supra note 29, at 39.

In Brody v. Overlook Hospital, 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd,
66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1974) (per curiam), the Supreme Court of New Jersey refused to
address the question whether the section 402A requirement of "unreasonably dangerous" should
be considered generally applicable in cases other than those involving drugs and bloodtransfusions, although the appellate division had found the provision applicable in those limited
contexts. 76 N.J. at 178, 386 A.2d at 828-29 (1978). The reluctance of the court to mandate use
of the provision was based on the decision in Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,
501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), where the California supreme court said it would look
only to whether the product was defective, not "unreasonably dangerous." Id. at 123-34, 501

P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. This holding was based on the belief that the "unreasonably
dangerous" test "diluted the intent of the strict liability in tort doctrine to relieve plaintiffs of
problems of proof of negligence." 76 N.J. at 178, 386 A.2d at 829. The Cepeda court noted that
the Cronin decision had been "widely criticized as providing no useful definition of an actionable
defect, particularly in relation to a case of a product of unsafe design." Id.
133 76 N.J. at 167-68, 386 A.2d at 823-24.
134 Id. at 169-73, 386 A.2d at 824-26.
135 Id. at 172-75, 179, 386 A.2d at 825-27, 829.
136 Id. at 176, 386 A.2d at 828.
137 Id. at 170, 386 A.2d at 825.
138 The New Jersey Comparative Negligence Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 1973),
was found inapplicable since the present cause of action arose in 1968. 76 N.J. at 189-90 & n.8,
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Viewed in its entirety, Cepeda reflects a continuing effort by the
courts to balance public policy considerations favoring increased manufacturer responsibility for safely designed products against the demands of modern industry to pursue economic goals that may carry
incidental and possibly unavoidable risks to employees and/or consumers. In this regard, the Wade-Keeton risk/utility analysis provides
a useful starting point in making a final determination that a design
defect actually exists, although the multiplicity of factors which must
be considered by the trial court may ultimately prove more unwieldy
than convenient in reaching a decision whether the case should go to
the jury. The unresolved controversy over the application of comparative negligence in a strict liability action may nonetheless require at
some future date a critical choice-whether or not the desire for
safer goods justifies the imposition of absolute liability upon a manufacturer for the failure to live up to an artificially created standard of
proper design, irrespective of any negligent activity on the part of a
plaintiff. Such a decision may ultimately turn more on questions of
existing technology, and the strength of unionism and consumerism at
that future date, than any abstract notion of what is correct law.
Author's Note:
The New Jersey supreme court in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Mach. Co., No. A-23 (Sup. Ct., July 31, 1979), overruled its decision in

Cepeda to the extent that contributory negligence is no longer a defense in a
design defect case where a machine operator is injured while acting as "intended or reasonably foreseeabl[y]' and where the injury would not have
occurred but for the defect. Id. at 35. Justice Schreiber, writing for the
majority, stated that the applicability of the New Jersey Comparative Negligence Act in strict liability cases would be limited to those instances where
contributory negligence would normally operate as a defense. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court made it clear that it was not expanding the
scope of contributory negligence as previously defined by the courts. Id.
Charles John Xavier Kahwaty

386 A.2d at 834. Two cases recently argued before the New Jersey supreme court, Cartel
Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 161 N.J. Super. 301, 391 A.2d 928 (App. Div. 1978), certif.
granted. 78 N.J. 407. 396 A.2d 593 (1978), and Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.,
No. A-2103-76 (App. Div. Feb. 6, 1978), certif. granted, 76 N.J. 240, 386 A.2d 864 (1978),
should finally address the issue of the applicability of comparative negligence as a defense to a
strict liability action. The superior court in both decisions found the New Jersey comparative
negligence statute to be inapplicable to such claims, since the doctrine of comparative negligence had not yet been specifically reviewed in a strict liability setting by the New Jersey
courts.

